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ATTORNEYS BEWARE: JERMAN V. CARLISLE 
HOLDS YOU LIABLE FOR TECHNICAL 
LEGAL ERRORS UNDER THE FDCPA 
Vartan S. Madoyan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices have 
long been a problem for consumers in our society.1 The need for 
protection from such practices is particularly high when third-party 
companies engage in debt collection. Unlike creditors, who are 
generally restrained by a desire to protect their reputation and 
goodwill with consumers whom they hope to later transact with, 
“independent collectors are likely to have no future contact with the 
consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer’s opinion of 
them.”2 As a result of this dynamic, Congress enacted the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or “Act”) in 1977 to better regulate 
third-party debt collectors.3 
While the FDCPA did not originally apply to attorneys,4 in 
1995, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 1986 amendment to the 
Act (“1986 Amendment”) brought attorneys firmly within the Act’s 
reach.5 Because the FDCPA imposes strict liability for certain 
 
 * J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Economics, 2007, University of 
California, San Diego. I want to thank Professor Lauren E. Willis for her thoughtful guidance and 
advice throughout this Comment, for without her, this would not have been possible. I also want 
to thank the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all of their hard work 
and effort in putting together this inaugural Supreme Court issue. And finally, I want to thank my 
friends and family for the continual support they have provided me along the way. 
 1. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1695–96; 
see also Penney on Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1985, at C15 (describing the J.C. Penney 
Company’s debt collectors’ harassment of some of the company’s customers more than twenty-
five years ago). 
 2. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2. 
 3. States may also supplement the FDCPA by providing further protection. Id. 
 4. See Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception or 
Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3107, 
3119–21 (2010). 
 5. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292, 299 (1995). 
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technical legal errors,6 creditors’ attorneys may feel forced to hesitate 
before advocating strongly for their clients’ legal positions, lest they 
risk their own personal liability. Although the FDCPA includes a 
“bona fide error” exception that excuses unintentional violations that 
occur despite procedures put in place to avoid such errors,7 circuit 
courts were split as to whether technical legal errors could qualify as 
bona fide errors under the Act.8 If they could not, then attorneys 
would be subject to strict liability (and potentially large monetary 
liability) under the FDCPA for otherwise honest errors. As a result, 
attorneys may strongly hesitate before advocating zealously for their 
clients. 
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit court split in 2010 in 
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,9 by 
reversing the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in the case and holding 
that the bona fide error exception does not apply to technical (or 
nontechnical) legal errors.10 Although the Court’s decision was based 
in part on statutory construction and legislative history, a majority of 
the Court concluded that its decision would not place “unmanageable 
burdens on lawyers practicing in the debt collection industry.”11 The 
dissent, however, expressed fear that as plaintiffs file more frivolous 
lawsuits in hopes of persuading defendants to settle,12 the majority’s 
decision could turn a segment of the legal system on its head by 
encouraging creditors’ attorneys to “adopt a debtor-friendly 
interpretation of every question.”13 
Although it is too soon to say which of these opinions will be 
borne out empirically, this Comment takes seriously the dissent’s 
 
 6. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1634–35 
(2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2002); 
see also Darren W. Ford, Comment, Secondary Liability Under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2010) (“[T]he majority of the Act’s provisions 
impose strict liability on debt collectors.”). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006). 
 8. Compare Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 476 
(6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010) (mistakes of law may qualify), and Johnson, 305 
F.3d at 1122–24 (same), with Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037, 1038 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (bona fide error defense unavailing), and Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 
F.2d 775, 779–80 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 
 9. 130 S. Ct. 1605. 
 10. Id. at 1608, 1610–11. 
 11. Id. at 1624. 
 12. Id. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at 1634. 
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concerns. Part II discusses the FDCPA’s statutory background and 
the factual background that led to the Court’s decision in Jerman. 
Part III describes the Court’s reasoning in holding that the bona fide 
error exception does not apply to mistakes of law. Part IV analyzes 
the potential conflict that forces attorneys to choose between zealous 
advocacy for their own clients and personal liability under the Act. 
Finally, Part V concludes that Congress should monitor the situation 
and amend the statute should this conflict prove irreconcilable. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Statutory Background 
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to protect consumers by 
curbing “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” by 
third parties who regularly collect debt for others.14 In addition to the 
FDCPA’s consumer-protection goals, Congress sought, by enacting 
the FDCPA, to ensure that those debt collectors who abstained from 
such abusive practices were not competitively disadvantaged in the 
marketplace.15 A violation of the FDCPA, whether enforced 
administratively by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or 
judicially through civil lawsuits, is therefore accompanied by varying 
and drastic financial implications.16 In fact, in addition to actual and 
statutory damages, the Act entitles successful civil plaintiffs to costs 
and reasonable attorney’s fees.17 
 
 14. Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006)). 
 15. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1608. 
 16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k–1692l. In administrative actions, for example, debt collectors 
are subject to penalties of up to $16,000 per day if found to have acted with “actual knowledge or 
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that [their actions were] unfair 
or deceptive and [were] prohibited [by the FDCPA].” Id. § 45(m)(1)(A)–(C); see also Federal 
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2010) (adjusting the 
maximum civil penalties to $16,000). In civil cases, in addition to actual damages, courts may 
award individual plaintiffs statutory damages up to $1,000, or, in class actions, award up to “the 
lesser of $500,000 or 1 [percent] of the net worth of the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2). 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), (3). Reasonable attorney’s fees are generally deemed 
mandatory in a successful case, regardless of the violation committed or the damages suffered. 
See Zagorski v. Midwest Billing Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing 
lower court’s decision to reject reasonable attorney’s fees for defendants’ de minimis violation); 
Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding reasonable 
attorney’s fees mandatory absent unusual circumstances, such as bad faith conduct); Graziano v. 
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 114 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, 
Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff was owed attorney’s fees unless defendant 
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Among other prohibitions, the FDCPA bars debt collectors from 
“making false representations as to a debt’s character, amount, or 
legal status; communicating with consumers at an ‘unusual time or 
place’ likely to be inconvenient to the consumer; or using obscene or 
profane language or violence or the threat thereof.”18 The FDCPA 
also contains specific notice provisions that debt collectors must 
affirmatively follow. With certain exceptions not pertinent here, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692g(a) provides that a debt collector must, within five 
days of its initial communication with a consumer, send the 
consumer a written notice containing “a statement that unless the 
consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the 
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed 
to be valid by the debt collector.”19 Although courts are split as to 
whether a consumer must specifically dispute the debt in writing to 
avoid this assumption,20 a written notification, if sent within the 
thirty-day period, will require a debt collector to cease debt-
collection activities until providing the debt verification or creditor 
information requested.21 
The Supreme Court has fundamentally characterized a violation 
of any of these provisions as a technical legal error, subjecting 
attorney debt collectors and their law firms to civil liability if the 
violations were committed during the course of their representation 
of a client.22 The FDCPA contains two exceptions, however, to the 
imposition of legal liability. The first exception, and the one most 
relevant to this Comment, provides: 
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action 
brought under [the FDCPA] if the debt collector shows by a 
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not 
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error 
 
could assert a successful § 1692k(c) defense on remand). But see Johnson v. Eaton, 80 F.3d 148, 
151–52 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying attorney’s fees because plaintiff suffered no actual damages). 
 18. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1608–09 (citations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c–1692e). 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
 20. Compare Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112 (finding that the lower court did not err in 
determining that only disputes made in writing were effective under the statute), with Camacho v. 
Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1080–82 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the statute does not 
require disputes to be made in writing). 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 22. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298–99 (1995); Stueben, supra note 4, at 3117–18. 
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notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid any such error.23 
The second exception requires defendants to act in good faith and “in 
conformity with any advisory opinion of the [FTC].”24 However, the 
FTC has rarely issued such advisory opinions.25 
B.  Factual Background 
In April 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., represented by 
respondents Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich Co., LPA, 
and Adrienne S. Foster (“Foster”), one of the law firm’s attorneys 
(collectively, “Carlisle” or “law firm”), filed a foreclosure action in 
an Ohio state court against petitioner Karen L. Jerman (“Jerman”), 
after one of Carlisle’s representatives called Jerman to verify her 
address and phone number.26 The summons and complaint served on 
Jerman included a notice stating that the “mortgage debt would be 
assumed to be valid unless Jerman disputed it in writing.”27 In 
response, Jerman’s attorney sent a letter to Foster stating that Jerman 
had paid the debt in full in January 2006 and that Jerman therefore 
disputed and sought to verify the alleged debt owed.28 After Foster 
verified with Countrywide that the debt was, in fact, paid in full, 
Foster quickly withdrew Countrywide’s foreclosure suit.29 
Jerman then filed a class action lawsuit against Carlisle in an 
Ohio district court contending that Carlisle had violated 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692g by stating in the notice that Jerman’s debt would be assumed 
valid unless disputed in writing.30 Although § 1692g requires debt 
collectors to give consumers such notices, it does not specifically 
 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 
 24. Id. § 1692k(e). 
 25. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1621 (2010) 
(noting that in the preceding decade, the FTC has issued only four opinions—in response to seven 
requests—with a typical response time of three to four months). 
 26. Id. at 1609; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 3–4, Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 502 F. Supp. 2d 686 
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (No. 1:06 CV 1397). 
 27. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609 (emphasis added). 
 28. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 26, at 3–4. 
 29. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609. 
 30. Id. 
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require a consumer to dispute the debt in writing.31 Jerman sued on 
this basis and, although she did not claim to have suffered harm as a 
result of Carlisle’s actions, sought class certification, actual damages, 
and statutory damages equal to the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of 
Carlisle’s net worth, plus attorney’s fees and costs.32 To assist her in 
calculating Carlisle’s net worth, during discovery Jerman “sought 
information from [Carlisle] concerning the income and net worth of 
each partner in the firm.”33 
Jerman later proposed to settle the case if Carlisle paid her 
$15,000 in damages and $7,500 in attorney’s fees.34 After settlement 
talks failed, the trial court granted summary judgment for Carlisle.35 
Despite the “division of authority on the question,” the trial court 
agreed with Jerman that Carlisle had violated § 1692g by including 
the “in writing” requirement in the notice.36 Nevertheless, the court 
ruled in Carlisle’s favor because it concluded that § 1692k(c) 
“shielded [the law firm] from liability because the violation was not 
intentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite the 
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such 
error.”37 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the bona 
fide error exception shielded Carlisle from liability for its technical 
legal error.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a 
circuit split as to whether the bona fide error exception extended to 
mistakes of law.39 
 
 31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (2006); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & 
Ulrich LPA, 464 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 32. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Amended Class Action 
Complaint: Unfair Debt Collection Practices at 4, Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d 720 (No. 1:06-CV-
01397), 2007 WL 681482). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (citing to the record). 
 35. See Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 720. 
 36. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609–10 (citing Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 722–25). 
 37. Id. at 1610 (citing Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 502 F. 
Supp. 2d 686, 695–97 (N.D. Ohio 2007)). 
 38. See id. (citing Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 
473–76 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1605). 
 39. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Courts are also split as to whether consumers 
are required to dispute debts in writing. See supra note 20. Because this issue was not raised on 
appeal, however, the Court expressed no view on the matter. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1610 & n.3. 
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III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
A.  Construction of Statutory Language 
The majority began by reiterating the “common maxim, familiar 
to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, 
either civilly or criminally.”40 It is likely for this reason, the majority 
opined, that “when Congress has intended to provide a mistake-of-
law defense to civil liability, it has often done so more explicitly than 
here.”41 
One such example is evident in the administrative penalty 
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which 
Congress incorporated into the FDCPA.42 The FTC Act explicitly 
holds debt collectors liable only when acting with “actual knowledge 
or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances” 
that their actions were unlawful.43 Given the absence of similar 
language in the FDCPA’s bona fide error provision, the majority 
concluded: 
[I]t is a fair inference that Congress chose to permit injured 
consumers to recover . . . for ‘intentional’ conduct, 
including violations resulting from [a] mistaken 
interpretation of the FDCPA, while reserving the more 
onerous penalties of the FTC Act for debt collectors whose 
intentional actions also reflected . . . [knowledge] that the 
conduct was prohibited.44 
The majority also noted that Congress did not confine liability 
under the FDCPA to only “‘willful’ violations, a term more often 
understood in the civil context to excuse mistakes of law.”45 It 
observed that even in the criminal context, references to “a 
‘knowing’ or ‘intentional’ ‘violation’ . . . has not necessarily implied 
a defense for legal errors.”46 The majority drew additional support for 
its finding from § 1692k(c)’s requirement that a debt collector 
 
 40. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1611 (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411 
(1833)). 
 41. Id. at 1612. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), (C) (2006)). 
 44. Id. For the dissent’s countervailing view, see infra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 45. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1613. 
 46. Id. (citations omitted). 
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maintain “procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”47 
Since the term “procedure” is defined as “a series of steps followed 
in a regular orderly definite way,” the majority reasoned that the 
FDCPA is more naturally interpreted as applying to mechanical, 
clerical, or factual errors, rather than legal errors, which can be more 
complex in nature.48 
Finally, the majority rejected Carlisle’s reliance on Heintz v. 
Jenkins.49 In Heintz, the Court first held that the 1986 Amendment 
meant that the Act’s definition of “debt collector” now included 
attorneys who regularly (even through litigation) attempt to collect 
consumer debts.50 In addition, the Heintz Court held that § 1692e(5) 
of the FDCPA—the provision prohibiting debt collectors from 
making any “threat to take action that cannot legally be taken”—
would not necessarily render an attorney liable for filing an 
unsuccessful claim against a debtor, rejecting the argument that such 
a scenario would involve an attorney taking an action void of legal 
support.51 The Heintz Court was skeptical that § 1692e(5) itself 
demanded such a result, but assuming it did, the decision suggested 
that an attorney’s potential liability was not “so absurd” or disruptive 
to the legal system as to warrant implying a categorical exemption 
because the bona fide error defense could save an attorney from such 
potential liability.52 In the instant case, the majority stated that 
Carlisle’s reliance on Heintz was unavailing because Heintz implied 
that, at most, attorneys could only invoke the FDCPA’s bona fide 
error defense for factual errors, not mistakes of law (such as a 
misinterpretation of the FDCPA’s requirements).53 
The dissent in Jerman, on the other hand, concluded very 
differently on many of these points. The dissent reasoned that in the 
civil context, the word “willful,” as opposed to the word 
“intentional,” has been used to impose a lower—not higher—
threshold for liability because even reckless acts have been deemed 
 
 47. Id. at 1614. 
 48. Id. at 1614–15 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1807 
(1976)). 
 49. 514 U.S. 291 (1995). 
 50. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1618 (citing Heintz, 514 U.S. at 292). 
 51. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (1988)). 
 52. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1618 (citing Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295). 
 53. See id. at 1618–19. 
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“willful.”54 Moreover, it surmised that even if the majority’s 
proffered distinction between “intentional” and “willful” exists, the 
Court’s precedent has specifically tailored such a distinction to the 
criminal context—not to civil cases.55 
The dissent also placed great weight on Congress’s use of the 
word “violation” in § 1692k(c).56 Under the dissent’s theory, the 
FDCPA’s juxtaposition of language denoting the mens rea 
requirement (in other words, its use of the word “intentional”) with 
the word “violation” created a mistake-of-law defense because a 
“violation” alludes to the notion of a legal infraction.57 The dissent 
therefore reasoned that, while the general maxim that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse remains true, the Act provided an express 
exception to this general prohibition.58 
Finally, the dissent stated that Heintz provided a further reason 
to interpret § 1692k(c) to include good faith legal errors.59 The 
dissent was troubled that the majority’s decision in Jerman 
undermined Heintz by concluding that “[a]ttorneys may now be held 
liable for taking reasonable legal positions in good faith if those 
positions are ultimately rejected.”60 In order to prevent such a result, 
the dissent read the FDCPA to provide the following statutory 
scheme: 
(1) intentional violations are punishable under the 
heightened penalties of the FTC Act; (2) unintentional 
violations are generally subject to punishment under the 
FDCPA; and (3) a defendant may escape liability altogether 
by proving that a violation [including a mistake of law] was 
based on a bona fide error and that reasonable error-
prevention procedures were in place.61 
 
 54. Id. at 1630 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Thus, “[a]voiding liability under a statute aimed at 
intentional violations should . . . be easier . . . than avoiding liability under a statute aimed at 
willful violations.” Id. 
 55. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)). 
 56. Id. at 1629. 
 57. Id. at 1629–30 (“The FDCPA’s use of [the word] ‘violation’ thus distinguishes it from 
most of the authorities relied upon by the [majority] to demonstrate that mistake-of-law defenses 
are disfavored.”). 
 58. Id. at 1636. 
 59. See id. at 1633. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1637. 
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B.  Legislative History 
While the majority and dissent each purported to find sufficient 
support for their positions from their differing interpretations of the 
statutory text, they each analyzed the FDCPA’s legislative history in 
an attempt to bolster their respective positions. Carlisle too, in 
advancing its position that mistakes of law were bona fide errors 
under the FDCPA, relied on legislative history in the form of a 
Senate Committee Report stating that “[a] debt collector has no 
liability . . . if he violates the [A]ct in any manner, including with 
regard to the [A]ct’s coverage, when such violation is unintentional 
and occurred despite procedures designed to avoid such violations.”62 
Carlisle asserted that because a mistake “with regard to the [A]ct’s 
coverage” would be a mistake of law, Congress intended the bona 
fide error defense to apply to such mistakes.63 The majority rejected 
this argument, however, stating that such a reading could have 
contemplated mistakes of fact affecting the Act’s coverage, not 
mistakes of law, particularly because the FDCPA did not originally 
apply to attorneys.64 
The majority, however, generally found the legislative record 
vague and uncertain when viewed in its entirety.65 On one hand, a 
Senate Banking Committee member who was a primary sponsor of 
the Act stated his view that “certain things ought not to happen, 
period,” implying a more limited bona fide error exception.66 On the 
other hand, a chairman in a legislative markup session confirmed 
from a staffer that the defense did not simply concern mathematical 
errors, but applied to “any violation of the act which was 
unintentional,” including “technical error[s].”67 Due to this 
uncertainty, the majority declined to give controlling weight to the 
legislative history.68 
Despite declaring that it would not give controlling weight to it, 
the majority looked to additional areas of legislative history and 
 
 62. Id. at 1619 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977), 
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699–700). 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1619 n.14. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. 
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believed that any remaining doubt about the proper interpretation of 
§ 1692k(c) was “dispelled by evidence of the meaning attached to 
the language Congress copied into the FDCPA’s bona fide error 
defense.”69 The bona fide error defense in TILA was copied 
verbatim, nine years later, into the FDCPA.70 During the nine-year 
period between TILA’s enactment and the FDCPA’s passage, the 
three circuit courts to consider the question (the Second, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits) interpreted TILA’s bona fide error defense as 
referring to only clerical errors.71 According to the majority, 
“repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates . . . 
[congressional] intent to incorporate its . . . [well-settled] judicial 
interpretations . . . .”72 While the majority acknowledged that 
interpretations by three circuit courts may not have “settled” the 
meaning of TILA’s bona fide error defense, it nevertheless 
concluded that there was no reason to suppose Congress disagreed 
with those interpretations when enacting the FDCPA.73 Thus, the 
majority found it reasonable to infer that, based on these three 
holdings, Congress understood the statutory formula it chose for the 
FDCPA.74 
The dissent attacked the majority’s assertion that the bona fide 
error defense’s language was well settled. It avowed that, given that 
this assumption was based on three appellate decisions, “which are 
contradicted by several District Court opinions and a State Supreme 
Court opinion[, this is] hardly a consistent legal backdrop against 
which to divine legislative intent.”75 While damages for technical 
 
 69. Id. at 1615. 
 70. Id. at 1615–16. 
 71. Id. at 1616 & n.10. 
 72. Id. at 1616 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)). 
 73. Id. However, as previously stated, other circuit courts have since held differently. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1122–24 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding bona fide error 
provision applies to mistakes of law). 
 74. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1616 & n.11. 
 75. Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion went even 
further in attacking the majority’s assertion that TILA’s history can provide some guidance in 
interpreting the FDCPA. According to Justice Scalia, it is “legal fiction” to assume that Congress 
understood the judicial interpretation of the bona fide error language based on merely three 
appellate decisions. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Although noting that the majority discounted what seemed to him as the most persuasive piece of 
legislative history (the “with regard to the Act’s coverage” debate), Scalia concluded that no 
weight should be given to the legislative record as it invariably disrupts the more appropriate 
textual analysis. Id. at 1625–28. 
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violations may be small, the dissent opined that the pressure to settle 
such cases to avoid litigation costs can be quite high.76 Moreover, the 
FDCPA requires courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to any 
successful plaintiff regardless of the extent of the damages.77 As a 
result, attorneys acting in good faith but making technical legal 
errors under the Act are unfairly disadvantaged.78 
C.  Policy Concerns 
As applied to an attorney’s technical legal error, the FDCPA has 
the potential to distort our legal system—a system based on zealous 
advocacy. The majority, however, found no such grave consequences 
from its reading of the Act’s bona fide error defense, focusing 
instead on other FDCPA provisions that could potentially curb such 
absurd results: (1) when an alleged violation is trivial, actual 
damages will likely be de minimis; (2) the FDCPA places a cap on 
statutory damages and vests courts with discretion to adjust such 
damages; and (3) although the FDCPA contemplates an award of 
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, courts have discretion in 
calculating what is reasonable, and “§ 1692k(a)(3) authorizes courts 
to award attorney’s fees to the defendant if a plaintiff’s suit ‘was 
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.’”79 The 
majority also observed that attorneys could avoid liability by 
obtaining advisory opinions from the FTC under § 1692k(e) but did 
not place significant weight on such a remedy because of the FTC’s 
impractical response time and, its frequent penchant for declining to 
even issue an opinion.80 
Finally, the majority surmised that an attorney’s interest in 
avoiding FDCPA liability will not always be adverse to his or her 
client’s interest, as some courts have held clients vicariously liable 
for their attorneys’ FDCPA violations.81 The majority also stated 
 
 76. Id. at 1632–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1620–21 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)–(3) 
(2006)). 
 80. Id. at 1621. Justice Breyer placed a greater burden on the FTC to more readily issue 
advisory opinions; because he assumed the FTC would do so in the future, Breyer concurred with 
the majority. Id. at 1625 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 1622 (majority opinion) (citing Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 
1516 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
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that, to the extent the FDCPA constrains an attorney’s advocacy on 
behalf of a client, such constraints are not new since attorneys are 
subject to judicial sanctions for harassment and improper actions 
during litigation and also must generally comply with standards of 
professional conduct.82 
In sum, the majority predicted that its decision would not 
unnecessarily burden attorney debt collectors.83 Absent a showing 
that “‘the result [would be] so absurd as to warrant’ disregarding the 
weight of textual authority,” the majority held that the bona fide error 
defense did not apply to legal errors, leaving it to Congress to 
address any policy concerns.84 
The dissent, however, opined that the Jerman decision would 
create impractical real-world scenarios for attorney debt collectors, 
conflict with attorneys’ ethical duties, and entrench the most 
troubling aspects of our legal system.85 Often a plaintiff does not seek 
a trial verdict and “will be just as happy with a settlement, as will his 
or her attorney (who will receive fees regardless).”86 A defendant 
may also prefer a quick settlement to the burdens of a protracted trial 
with high litigation costs and greater potential liability, particularly 
in class actions.87 Indeed, the dissent found that the present case 
precisely illustrated this point.88 
The dissent stated that Congress enacted the bona fide error 
defense precisely because it too was troubled by this dynamic.89 That 
trial courts have discretion to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees—
and can award fees to a defendant if a lawsuit is brought in bad 
faith—provides no bulwark against these concerns.90 The dissent 
explained that a fee award is not, in practice, rigorously adjusted 
based on a court’s assessment of a suit’s utility.91 Moreover, if a 
plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment or settlement, “then by 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1624. 
 84. Id. (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295 (1995)). 
 85. Id. at 1628–29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 1631. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (referring to Jerman filing suit despite suffering no injuries and, after merits-related 
discovery, offering to settle the case for $22,500); see supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 89. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 1631–32. 
 91. Id. at 1632. 
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definition the suit will not have been brought in bad faith.”92 Thus, a 
potential fee award is highly unlikely and will not deter plaintiffs 
from alleging ostensibly frivolous FDCPA claims. 
Next, the dissent feared that the Jerman decision would subject 
attorneys to liability when they had done nothing wrong, indeed, 
“even when they have acted in accordance with their professional 
responsibilities.”93 The instant case offered proof of such an 
outcome, as Carlisle had acted reasonably, had acted in good faith, 
and had not injured Jerman.94 This problem is further underscored 
because, “even where a particular practice is compelled by existing 
precedent, the attorney may be sued if that precedent is later 
overturned.”95 This is so, the dissent reasoned, because the majority 
deemed the conduct actionable as an “intentional ‘violation.’”96 For 
these reasons, the dissent concluded that the majority opinion would 
create an unworkable reality for attorney debt collectors. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Court’s Reading of the FDCPA’s Text and Legislative 
History Places Too Little Weight in Some Areas and Too Much in 
Others 
The majority inferred from its construction of the statutory text 
and the history of the bona fide error provision that appears in both 
the FDCPA and TILA that Congress did not intend the defense to 
apply to mistakes of law. This conclusion seems improper. While 
three circuit courts had held, during the nine-year period between 
TILA’s enactment and the FDCPA’s passage, that TILA’s bona fide 
error provision applied only to clerical errors,97 that is hardly 
sufficient to conclude that the judicial interpretation of the language 
of this provision was well settled.98 In fact, the Sixth and Tenth 
 
 92. Id. (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 1634–35. 
 94. Id. at 1635. 
 95. Id. at 1634. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1616 & n.10 (majority opinion); see supra text accompanying notes 70–74. 
 98. Id. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It seems to 
me unreasonable, however, to assume that, when Congress has a bill before it that contains 
language used in an earlier statute, it is aware of, and approves as correct, a mere three Court of 
Appeals decisions interpreting that earlier statute over the previous nine years.”). 
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Circuits recently issued decisions conflicting with those of the three 
prior circuit courts.99 The majority essentially acknowledged this 
fact, yet stated that “there is [also] no reason to suppose that 
Congress disagreed with those [prior] interpretations [of the Second, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits] when it enacted the FDCPA.”100 
Perhaps the majority’s supposition is correct. However, this analysis 
tells us nothing about whether Congress intended to so limit the 
scope of the bona fide error defense as applied to an attorney’s 
mistake of law because, when originally enacted, the FDCPA 
exempted attorneys from liability altogether.101 In creating the 
FDCPA, Congress simply did not consider the ramifications of 
failing to give attorney debt collectors a bona fide error defense for 
technical legal errors. 
Although undervalued by the Court, the amendments to the 
FDCPA represent another crucial factor in the analysis. While Heintz 
held that the 1986 Amendment brought litigating attorneys within the 
Act’s scope,102 Congress did not expressly state that the bona fide 
error exception excluded mistakes of law despite the eight 
amendments it has made (thus far) to the FDCPA.103 Although it 
seems difficult to infer from Congress’s silence that it intended this 
exception to apply to legal errors, Congress has, on the other hand, 
expressly stated that mistakes of law are inapposite in TILA.104 It is 
not surprising that a similar statement is absent from the FDCPA 
given its goals of curbing unfair debt-collection practices and 
ensuring that honest debt collectors are not competitively 
disadvantaged. Bona fide legal mistakes, particularly technical 
mistakes causing no damage, cannot be called “unfair debt collection 
practices,”105 nor do debt collectors “gain a competitive advantage by 
making good-faith legal errors any more than by making good-faith 
factual errors.”106 The absence of similar language in TILA and the 
 
 99. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010); Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1122–24 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
 100. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1616. 
 101. See Stueben, supra note 4, at 3119–20. 
 102. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995). 
 103. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1617, 1624 n.22. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (2006). 
 105. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1632 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 1633. 
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FDCPA suggests that Congress recognizes this dynamic. The 
attorney exemption in the original FDCPA resolved any conflict that 
might have otherwise existed between an attorney’s duty to a client 
and that attorney’s compliance with the FDCPA. The order of events 
here means one can infer nearly nothing from this legislative history. 
Moreover, as the dissent points out, the plain language of 
§ 1692k(c) provides a bona fide error defense specifically for 
unintentional “violations,” rather than unintentional “conduct.”107 
This language, combined with a Senate Committee Report stating 
that the bona fide error provision also applies “with regard to the 
[A]ct’s coverage,” makes the Court’s decision even more peculiar.108 
A violation regarding the FDCPA’s coverage or scope seems to be 
Congress’s way of including mistakes of law as bona fide errors.109 
This reading should be particularly favored given that the other 
possible exception under the FDCPA—seeking an advisory opinion 
from the FTC and acting in reliance upon it—has proven impractical, 
as the FTC has issued only four opinions in response to seven 
requests in the decade preceding Jerman, with a typical response 
time of three to four months.110 In practice, if the FTC even chooses 
to respond to an attorney’s request, a three- to four-month delay 
before an attorney can advise a client as to how to act makes the 
process essentially unusable. 
The majority, however, seemed to ignore the FTC’s failures in 
this area, focusing instead on the “role Congress evidently 
contemplated for the FTC in resolving ambiguities in the Act.”111 
 
 107. Id. at 1629; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 
 108. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1619 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700); id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“The Court claims that a mistake about ‘the [A]ct’s coverage’ in this passage might 
refer to factual mistakes . . . . The Court’s explanation seems to me inadequate. No lawyer—
indeed, no one speaking accurately—would equate a mistake regarding the Act’s coverage with a 
mistake regarding whether a particular fact situation falls within the Act’s coverage.”). 
 109. That the FDCPA did not originally apply to attorneys does not undermine this argument, 
since non-attorneys may also make legal errors. Non-attorneys “sometimes receive and rely upon 
erroneous legal advice from attorneys. Indeed, if anyone could satisfy the defense’s requirement 
of maintaining ‘procedures reasonably adapted to avoid’ a legal error, it would be a non-attorney 
[who directs] . . . all legal questions to his attorney.” Id. at 1628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 110. See id. at 1621, 1624 (majority opinion) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING 
CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 67 (2009)); id. at 1635 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 1615 (majority opinion). 
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Since § 1692k(e) exempts acts done or omitted in conformity with 
any advisory opinion of the FTC, the majority reasoned that debt 
collectors “would rarely need to consult the FTC if [the bona fide 
error defense] . . . offer[ed] immunity for good-faith reliance on 
advice from private counsel.”112 However, this analysis ignores the 
possibility that Congress intended to include two separate 
alternatives to immunity, and that these alternatives may overlap. If, 
for example, the FTC’s response is lacking or is unreasonably 
delayed through no fault of the debt collector, it seems sensible for 
Congress to provide that debt collector with another road to 
immunity. In this sense, the dissent’s proposed statutory scheme113 
seems more reasonable. 
B.  The Potentially Untenable  
Consequences of the Majority’s Decision 
The FDCPA’s difficult and imprecise text and legislative history 
do not unequivocally support one interpretation of the Act. 
Nevertheless, the potential disruption to an attorney’s ethical duties 
may ultimately carry the day. Imagine a scenario in which an 
attorney collecting an alleged debt for a client follows the current 
legal precedent and interpretation of one of the FDCPA’s many 
technical provisions. Shortly thereafter, this precedent is overturned. 
The consumer allegedly owing the debt then files an FDCPA-based 
lawsuit against the attorney for violating a technical aspect of the 
FDCPA. Under the Jerman decision, the attorney cannot rely on the 
FDCPA’s bona fide error provision to excuse this legal error. While 
actual damages may be small or nonexistent, the potentially high cost 
of defending such a suit gives attorney-defendants great incentive to 
settle the matter. This is true particularly because a trier of fact may 
nevertheless award statutory damages and may in fact be required to 
award the plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.114 Jerman 
teaches that this scenario is quite possible, as Jerman herself brought 
an FDCPA-based lawsuit “despite suffering no harm,” and quickly 
sought to settle her case for $22,500.115 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 115. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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This very real threat presents attorneys with a host of conflicts. 
While an attorney “must be given some latitude to zealously 
advocate for his or her client,”116 under the majority’s reading of the 
FDCPA, the Act holds attorneys liable for technical legal errors that 
do not truly touch on the abusive practices that Congress designed 
the Act to prevent. Thus, attorneys may be found liable under the Act 
for technical legal errors despite having acted in good faith. 
Although the majority noted that other constraints on judicial 
advocacy exist, these constraints assume that an attorney acted not in 
good faith but with an improper purpose.117 This further constraint on 
judicial advocacy means that an attorney cannot foreclose the 
possibility of a seemingly frivolous, but sanctioned, lawsuit without 
taking a debtor-friendly approach to a given situation presented by a 
debt-collecting client. 
The majority discounted such consequences of its holding by 
noting that a trial court has discretion to determine statutory damages 
and that only “reasonable” attorney’s fees are awarded under the 
FDPCA.118 However, any suit that is technically successful, even one 
that nets a plaintiff next to nothing in damages, requires an award of 
costs and reasonable fees.119 Moreover, in the Ninth Circuit (as in 
other jurisdictions), a district court must calculate attorney’s fees 
under the lodestar method.120 The lodestar figure is calculated by 
multiplying the reasonable hourly rate of the prevailing party’s 
attorney by the number of hours the attorney reasonably expended on 
the litigation.121 This figure is considered presumptively reasonable 
and may only be adjusted upward or downward in rare cases.122 This 
system of calculating fees presents an attorney-defendant with an 
 
 116. People v. Kalnoki, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827, 829 (Super. Ct. 1992). 
 117. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1622. 
 118. Id. at 1620–21. 
 119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 120. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferland v. 
Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)); see Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 
 121. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 (quoting Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149 n.4). 
 122. Id. at 982 (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992)); see 
Kristin A.C. Olin, Comment, Unreasonable Calculations of “Reasonable” Fees: Perdue v. 
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn and the Supreme Court’s Ongoing Struggle with 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 44 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1113, 1117–24 (2010) (discussing the facts, reasoning, limitations on lodestar 
adjustment, and weaknesses in the holding of Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 
(2010), the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent opinion addressing lodestar enhancement). 
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even greater risk of liability if he or she refuses to settle a sanctioned 
yet frivolous lawsuit, particularly because a trial court’s attorney’s 
fee award under § 1692k is reviewed on appeal under a lenient 
abuse-of-discretion standard.123 
Although the majority appeared to assume otherwise,124 at least 
in counteracting the dissent, a mistake-of-law defense need not apply 
to all third-party debt collectors (such as non-attorneys) or absolve 
all legal errors. Limiting the defense to only technical legal errors 
and only to attorneys (or third-party debt collectors who act pursuant 
to an attorney’s advice) is sufficient to counteract the potential 
consequences of the majority’s decision. Such a careful rewriting of 
the Act is an assignment best left to Congress but seems to align 
more properly with the goals stated in the FDCPA. This limited 
exception would allow attorneys to advocate for their clients 
appropriately while avoiding the evisceration of the FDCPA that 
would occur if all debt collectors could claim a bona fide mistake-of-
law defense. 
In so limiting the scope of the defense, and in remembering that 
a defendant must also maintain procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid such errors,125 the FDCPA’s practical effect will better coincide 
with Congress’s objectives. It will also coincide with the Heintz 
Court’s declaration that its interpretation of the FDCPA (as applied 
to attorneys) will not produce absurd results.126 While it remains to be 
seen whether the Jerman decision will produce absurd results or 
whether the FTC will continue to reluctantly issue advisory opinions, 
Congress would be wise to so amend the FDCPA should empirical 
evidence point in either of these directions. 
V.  PROPOSAL 
As Justice Kennedy eloquently stated, “[w]hen statutory 
provisions have not yet been interpreted in a definitive way, 
principled advocacy is to be prized, not punished.”127 When a reading 
 
 123. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621 n.16; see also Camacho, 523 F.3d at 977–78 (“If we 
conclude that the district court applied the proper legal principles and did not clearly err in any 
factual determination, then we review the award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.” 
(quoting Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148)). 
 124. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1623. 
 125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006). 
 126. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295–98 (1995). 
 127. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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of federal law “would seriously undermine the attorney-client 
relationship,” the law should be “narrowly construed.”128 Jerman 
opens the door precisely to this danger. As such, the situation must 
be monitored carefully, and if the danger is borne out empirically, 
Congress must resolve it by amending the FDCPA before the conflict 
proves irreconcilable. 
First, Congress must monitor whether the FTC amends its 
practice of failing to issue advisory opinions to some requests and 
responding too late to others. While the seven requests mentioned 
above present quite a small sample size, an average delay of three to 
four months is impractical for attorney debt collectors.129 If, as 
Justice Breyer assumed,130 the FTC increases the number of advisory 
opinions it issues and reduces delays, the need to include legal errors 
within the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense will be substantially 
lessened. 
Second, because Jerman interprets the FDCPA to subject 
attorneys to personal liability for technical legal errors under the Act, 
Congress must monitor whether the foundation of zealous advocacy 
on which our legal system relies is overtly undermined. It can do so 
through traditional methods (organizing subcommittees dedicated to 
such observation, polling constituents, or speaking to experts on the 
matter) or by monitoring the courts (conducting empirical studies on 
the rise of related FDCPA-based lawsuits or the rate at which 
attorneys more often face civil suits or state bar charges for relevant 
ethical violations). 
If Congress finds a mounting disruption to our system of zealous 
advocacy, it would be wise to include legal errors within the 
FDCPA’s bona fide error defense. Limiting this expanded defense to 
only attorney debt collectors or debt collectors acting pursuant to an 
attorney’s advice and only to technical legal errors (rather than all 
legal errors), will likely effectuate Congress’s stated goals in 
enacting the FDCPA while minimizing undesired and negative 
consequences to our legal system. On the whole, non-attorneys will 
also benefit greatly from such a change as their attorneys will better 
 
 128. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1338 n.5 
(2010). 
 129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra note 80. 
  
Spring 2011] JERMAN V. CARLISLE 1111 
be able to represent their interests without fear of personal or 
professional conflict. 
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